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Can Indian Tribes Sell or Encumber Their Fee Lands Without Federal Approval?
Mark A. Jarboe and Daniel B. Watts1
“This Court has never determined whether the Indian
Nonintercourse Act, which was enacted in 1834, applies to
land that has been rendered alienable by Congress and later
reacquired by an Indian tribe.”2
I. The Issue
A few years ago, an Indian tribe in the Pacific Northwest desired to purchase a
hotel located on a parcel of land owned in fee by a non-Indian party and to finance the
acquisition with a bank loan. The bank was willing to make the loan on terms
acceptable to the tribe, including a requirement that the loan be secured by a mortgage
on the hotel and site. The structuring and documentation of the loan overcame the
normal hurdles and challenges until it hit an unforeseen obstacle: Could the tribe legally
grant the required mortgage to the bank?
What caused the concern was one of the oldest federal statutes still in effect: 25
U.S.C. §177, referred to as the “Indian Nonintercourse Act” (the “INIA” or the “Act”).
The INIA states:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or
of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the
same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant
to the Constitution. Every person who, not being employed
under the authority of the United States, attempts to
negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or
to treat with any such nation or tribe of Indians for the title or
purchase of any lands by them held or claimed, is liable to a
penalty of $1,000. The agent of any State who may be
present at any treaty held with Indians under the authority of
the United States, in the presence and with the approbation
of the commissioner of the United States appointed to hold
the same, may, however, propose to, and adjust with, the
1
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Indians the compensation to be made for their claim to lands
within such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty.3
Although most tribal land holdings consist of trust land, 4 the land at issue in this
transaction was not. Rather, it was non-Indian owned fee land that the tribe was
purchasing directly from a non-Indian owner.5 The question that the tribe and its lender
faced was: Does the INIA apply to land acquired by a tribe in fee?
A. Confusion in the Authorities
Our examination of the INIA revealed several conflicting lines of authority.
However, while there is considerable divergence in the discussion of the scope and
reach of the Act,6 there is surprisingly little divergence as to its scope and reach in
practice. We have not found any case in which a final decision has applied the INIA to
land acquired and held by a tribe in fee7 so as to prevent a sale, transfer, or
encumbrance. Nevertheless, judicial, congressional, and administrative authorities
often speak as though the Act does apply to fee lands, with those authorities both
ignoring each other and failing to consider the context in which the INIA arose. 8 This
has resulted in confusion and uncertainty for tribes and their business partners. We
believe that the only practical way to eliminate that uncertainty is through a
congressional enactment settling the issue.
B. Effects on the Tribes
As a policy matter, application of the INIA to tribally owned fee lands would be
beneficial to tribes under certain circumstances and detrimental under others.
3

The INIA was first enacted in 1790, was amended and extended in 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834.
It was given its present form in 1875. Each of the first four enactments was in effect for three years at a
time, thus triggering the periodic reenactments. Act of July 22, 1790, Pub. L. No. 1–33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137,
138; Act of March 1, 1793, Pub. L. No. 2–19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329, 330; Act of May 19, 1796, Pub. L. No. 4–
30, § 12, 1 Stat. 469, 472; Act of March 3, 1799, Pub. L. No. 5–46, § 12, 1 Stat. 743, 746; Act of March
30, 1802, Pub. L. No. 7–13, § 12, 2 Stat. 139, 143; Act of June 30, 1834, Pub. L. No. 23–161, § 12, 4
Stat. 729, 730.
4
See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 98 (3d ed. 2002).
5
Fee title to trust land is held by the United States of America in trust for the beneficial interest of the
tribe. There are also individual trust lands held similarly for the benefit of individual Indians; those lands
are not within the scope of this paper. Trust land cannot be encumbered or sold by the tribe without the
approval of the federal government—the tribe doesn’t hold the fee title to trust land and, as a fundamental
principal of property law, only the fee owner of a parcel of land can transfer or encumber it—and the INIA
is irrelevant to trust land as a result. Trust land is also not subject to state or local property taxation
because it is property of the United States of America.
6
For example, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook, the bible of federal Indian law, states on the subject: “If land
is purchased by tribes without federal involvement … the express terms of the statute seem to apply, but
its application is uncertain owing to a series of tax decisions.” F ELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW § 15.06[4] (2005) (citations omitted) [hereinafter COHEN].
7
Other than in the case of the former Spanish Pueblos, as discussed below in Section IV.A.
8
See § IV. C, infra.
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Restriction of tribally owned fee lands from transfer would reduce the chance of their
removal from tribal ownership and control through involuntary means (for example,
property taxation and execution on a judgment). However, that same restriction would
prevent voluntary transfers and encumbrances, thereby reducing—or eliminating—a
tribe’s ability to derive economic benefit from the land by obtaining a mortgage for the
purpose of acquiring the land or using the land as collateral for a loan to finance the
construction of improvements.9 A clarification of the INIA’s original purpose and a
limitation of the Act to its original scope would, likewise, be beneficial to tribes under
some circumstances and detrimental under others. Tribes would be unrestricted in their
ability to transfer and encumber fee lands voluntarily but they would also be vulnerable
to the involuntary loss of fee land.
As discussed below, in some jurisdictions courts have held that the INIA does not
restrict the taxation, and subsequent involuntary loss, of tribal fee land but in those
same jurisdictions there have been no assurances that the INIA does not restrict
voluntary transfers or encumbrances of that same land. As a result, the tribes in those
jurisdictions suffer both detrimental interpretations of the INIA.
C. Changes in the Nature of Tribal Land Holdings
Although the core language of the INIA has changed little over the past 220
years, the world of tribal land ownership has changed much. In 1790, almost all of the
land that now constitutes the United States was owned and possessed by the tribes. 10
Title to nearly all of this aboriginal land has since been ceded to the United States,
patented and resold to non-Indians.11 Reservations—areas set aside from an aboriginal
land cession and reserved for the sole use of the ceding Indians—were established,
9

For example, while considering what eventually became Public Law 106-217, which authorized the
Lower Sioux Community to sell or encumber its fee lands, Rep. Don Sherwood (R-PA) remarked that
“[t]he Lower Sioux Community has found this law [the INIA] to be a major detriment to economic
development. The law puts the tribe at a distinct disadvantage, because it finds that it cannot develop or
use land which it has acquired to its full advantage.” C ONG. REC., H521 (Feb. 29, 2000). Mr. Sherwood
was followed by Rep. David Minge (D-MN) who stated:
I would like to suggest to the subcommittee that it consider legislation that deals
with this type of situation because I expect that the Lower Sioux community is not
the only Native American group in the United States that faces this type of
obstacle to the disposition of land that it has purchased which has not been in
trust status which is off of its reservation area.
CONG. REC., H521-H522 (Feb. 29, 2000).
Some commentators have argued that even the federal restrictions on encumbrances of trust
lands should be revisited for these same reasons. See, e.g., United States Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, Oversight Hearing on Economic Development, May 10, 2006 (testimony of Mr. Lance Morgan,
CEO of Ho-Chunk, Inc), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Morgan051006.pdf.
10
Felix Cohen, Original Indian Title, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 278–
279 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1970); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
11
See Indian Reservations in the Continental United States (map), available at
http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/DOCUMENTS/ResMap.htm.
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then broken up, allotted and sold, mostly to non-Indians. Some tribes are actively
reacquiring land within their reservations or other historical areas, and other tribes are
acquiring or reacquiring land outside of those areas. Contemporary tribal land
ownership now includes trust and fee land both within and outside reservation
boundaries. None of these situations were present—or even envisioned—at the time
the INIA was enacted, but the language “[n]o purchase, grant, lease or other
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians” still remains.
D. Outline of this Paper
Part II of this paper provides the history and legal underpinnings of the INIA. Part
III explores the few early interpretations of the INIA. Part IV explores 20th and 21st
century judicial, congressional, and administrative interpretation of the INIA. Next,
because the authors recognize that tribes and the business community will not be
willing to rest the legitimacy of their transactions on the persuasiveness of even a wellwritten law journal article, Part V proposes the consideration of a Congressional
enactment to confirm the original reach and scope of the INIA. Finally, Part VI offers a
conclusion.
II. Underlying Legal Theory of the INIA – Aboriginal Title and the Doctrine of
Preemption
“Every schoolboy is taught to believe that the lands of the
United States were acquired by purchase or treaty from
Britain, Spain, France, Mexico, and Russia. . . .
Notwithstanding this prevailing mythology, the historic fact is
that practically all of the real estate acquired by the United
States since 1776 was purchased not from Napoleon or any
other emperor or czar but from its original
Indian
landowners. . . . What we did acquire from Napoleon was not
the land, which was not his to sell, but simply the power to
govern and tax, the same sort of power that we gained with
the acquisition of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands a century
later.”12
The INIA codifies one of the most important concepts of federal and tribal
relations: the doctrine of aboriginal title, a doctrine older than the United States itself.
This doctrine served as the foundation for both the original enactment of the INIA and its
subsequent revisions and is implicit in the application of the Act.13 The concept of
12
13

Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34–35 (1947).
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 139–144 (1970).
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aboriginal title is entwined with the European doctrine of preemption; aboriginal title
consists of a tribe’s right to possession of its land subject to the preemptive right of the
sovereign to acquire the land if and when the tribe decided to sell.14
The doctrine of preemption evolved as European nations, discovering more of
the New World, sought a theory both to explain their relationship with the native
occupiers of the land and to prevent competing nations from intruding in their respective
areas of interest.15 The theory, stated briefly, is that the discovering nation, by virtue of
its discovery, obtained dominion and sovereignty over the land discovered. 16 The
Indian tribes, as native occupiers of the land, continued to hold the right of possession
to the land, but did so subject to the sovereignty of the discovering nation. 17 And the
discovering nation—the sovereign—had the exclusive right to acquire the interests of
the tribe in the land if and when the tribe decided to part with it.18 As Chief Justice
Marshall explained:
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely
disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their
power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it.19
When the United States became independent following the Revolution, the
sovereignty over the land, and the right of preemption as to Indian lands, moved from

14

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572–584 (1823).
PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 139–144.
16
Id.
17
See the extensive historical discussion by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572–584. One
of the seminal decisions of federal Indian law, the case involved claims of title to aboriginal lands
purported to be conveyed to private individuals by the chiefs of two tribes in 1773 and 1775, prior to the
Revolution and prior to the enactment of the INIA. The Court held that the purported transfer was
ineffective as it was in violation of the government’s right of preemption.
18
The right of pre-emption resided in the sovereign—the discovering nation—and not its individual
subjects. Only the sovereign itself could acquire title from the aboriginal inhabitants. That principal was
made clear, as to the English colonies of North America, in the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763.
19
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
15
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the English Crown to the new government.20 The first Congress enacted the first
version of the INIA in the year following the adoption of the Constitution, thus confirming
the federal government’s position as to the successor to the Crown as holder of the right
of preemption and its control over the acquisition of lands from the tribes as the new
nation grew and expanded.
The history of its enactment leaves little question that the INIA was intended only
to apply to the original acquisition of aboriginal title from the tribes. That is, the INIA
was intended to protect the federal government’s preemptive right to acquire aboriginal
title from tribes, preventing other countries, the states, or individuals from doing so. As
we shall see, however, as tribal land holdings expanded to include trust and fee lands
the broad language of the INIA began to be applied—at least in word—to those lands as
well.
III. Early Authorities
There is little 19th century authority interpreting the INIA. The first authority
specifically addressing the effect of the INIA on fee patented lands held by a tribe is a
May 14, 1857 opinion of U.S. Attorney General Jeremiah Black. 21 In that matter, the
1854 treaty between the United States and the Delaware Indians, by which the
Delaware ceded lands to the United States, contemplated the sale and patenting of
certain of those lands to the “Christian Indians.”22 The Christian Indians had settled
within the aboriginal territory of the Delawares and had made improvements to the lands
they occupied.23 During the treaty making negotiations between the Delawares and the
United States the parties contemplated a sale of the lands to the Christian Indians at
$2.50/acre.24 The Secretary of the Interior posed several questions regarding the
nature of the title that would be held by the Christian Indians to Attorney General Black,
who provided the following opinion:
[A]fter these lands shall be confirmed to the Christian Indians
by patent they will not hold them by the usual Indian title.
The usual Indian title was in the Delawares. It was
extinguished by the first article of the treaty, and an absolute
title vested in the United States. The United States will
convey their right to the Christian Indians by the patent, and
20

After a period of uncertainty under the Articles of Confederation, when there was disagreement as to
whether that sovereignty and right flowed to the national government or to the individual states as
successors to the former colonies, see COHEN at § 15.06[1], the issue was settled in the Constitution of
1789 which vested in the Congress the power “to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,” U.S.
Const., art. I, § 8.
21
Christian Indians, 9 Op. Att’y. Gen. 24 (1857).
22
Id. at 2.
23
Id. at 2.
24
Id. at 2–3.
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they will hold,
Government.25

like

any other

purchaser, from

the

The phrase “like any other purchaser” leaves little doubt that the Christian
Indians took title to the lands in fee simple. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, the lands would be subject to the INIA and the Christian Indians would require
federal approval to sell the lands freely:
I cannot think that it [the INIA] applies merely to those Indian
tribes who hold their lands by the original Indian title. The
words are broad enough to include a tribe holding lands by
patent from the United States, and the purpose of the statute
manifestly requires it to receive that construction.26
Twenty-eight years later, Attorney General Augustus Hill Garland was asked to
determine whether the INIA required federal approval of surface leases of tribal trust
land to non-Indian ranchers on three reservations in what was then the Indian
Territory.27 Attorney General Garland took a similarly sweeping view of the applicability
of the INIA to Indian land transactions.28 He concluded that:
This statutory provision [the INIA] is very general and
comprehensive. Its operation does not depend upon the
nature or extent of the title to the land which the tribe or
nation may hold. Whether such title be a fee simple, or a
right of occupancy merely, is not material; in either case the
statute applies. . . . Whatever the right or title may be, each
of these tribes or nations is precluded, by the force and
effect of the statute, from either alienating or leasing any part
of its reservation, or imparting any interest or claim in or to
the same, without the consent of the Government of the
United States.29
Although Attorney General Garland’s words follow the thinking of his
predecessor, the context of his opinion involved reservation lands—lands set aside for
the tribes by act of the United States.30 As a federal set-aside, those lands belonged to
the United States and federal approval of their sale or encumbrance would have been
required by virtue of that fact alone; recourse to the INIA was not necessary and the
25

Id. at 4.
Id. at 6–7.
27
Lease of Indian Lands for Grazing Purposes, 18 Op. Att’y. Gen. 235 (1885).
26

28
29 Id.
30

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 1.
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opinion’s language goes beyond what is necessary to reach the proper result.
Notwithstanding that, the little authority that there is from the 19th century reads the INIA
literally and applies it to any lands held by a tribe under any form of title.
IV. 20th and 21st Century Authorities
In the 20th and 21st centuries courts began to address the scope of the INIA. The
modern cases arose in a number of different contexts due both to the varying historical
contexts in which tribal lands were set aside and to the growing diversity of the nature of
tribal land ownership. First came the Pueblo fee land cases, in which Pueblos in former
Spanish territory held land nominally in fee but subject to restraints on alienation under
Spanish law. Next we consider the cases dealing with the condemnation of lands of the
Tuscarora Nation in New York, which are sometimes cited as standing for the
proposition that the INIA applies to tribal fee lands but in fact do not. We then look at
cases that state that the INIA applies to tribal fee lands and find that that conclusion is
dicta. Finally, we look at the most recent cases which do not apply the INIA to tribal fee
lands.
A. Pueblo Fee Land Cases
The analysis of 20th century cases starts with a series of decisions known as the
Pueblo fee land cases. These cases, two from the Supreme Court and one from the
Tenth Circuit, have been read to stand for more than what they actually hold. The
Pueblo fee land cases addressed the status of lands held by Indian pueblos in the
southwest United States in the area formerly held by Spain, then by Mexico after its
independence, then acquired by the United States in 1848 under the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.31 They have often been cited for the proposition that the INIA
applies to lands held by tribes in fee, which is superficially correct. 32 However the
nature of that fee title as it originated under Spanish law is an anomaly which the courts
concluded to be the functional equivalent of aboriginal or trust title elsewhere in the
country.33 The application of the INIA to those lands, once they came under the
jurisdiction of the United States, necessarily followed in order to apply the same
protections and restrictions to those lands as applied to aboriginal lands under United
States law.
The first of these cases, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), involved
not the INIA but the application of federal statutes restricting the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into Indian country in New Mexico. The Court traced the nature of the
31

See infra pp. 8–10. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, formerly known as the Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, was signed on February 2, 1848 and
proclaimed on July 4, 1848. 9 Stat. 922.
32
33 Id.

United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39–40 (1913).

17

land holdings of the New Mexico pueblos which originated in grants from the Spanish
Crown.34 These grants were reserves made in fee simple status but subject to
restraints on alienation under Spanish law and official supervision by the Crown. 35 That
status continued upon acquisition of the territory by the United States and confirmation
of the Spanish grants by Congress.36 Therefore, although the pueblos in what was
formerly a Spanish possession held their land in fee simple, that fee was granted to
them by the Spanish crown under a guardian/wardship concept similar to the trust
concept that developed in the United States (where the fee itself is held by the United
States).37 Sandoval thus established the basic nature of pueblo fee title.
The next case in the line is United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
This case involved an action brought by the United States “to quiet in the Indian Pueblo
of Laguna the title to certain lands alleged to belong to the pueblo in virtue of a grant
from Spain, its recognition by Mexico and a confirmation and patent by the United
States.”38 The Court specifically held that the INIA applied to lands held by the pueblos
based on the guardian/ward relationship previously identified.39 The Court stated:
Under the Spanish law Pueblo Indians, although having full
title to their lands, were regarded as in a state of tutelage
and could alienate their lands only under governmental
supervision. . . . Thus it appears that Congress in imposing a
restriction on the alienation of these lands, as we think it did,
was but continuing a policy which prior governments had
deemed essential to the protection of such Indians.40
In short, under Spanish law the pueblos were unable to alienate their land
without governmental consent, even though the fee title held by the pueblos, and that
restriction carried over when the land involved became part of the United States. That
restriction could not be applied through the concept of trust title, because fee title was
held by the pueblos rather than the United States. The legal vehicle used to accomplish
the result was the INIA.
The final case of the three, Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189 (10th Cir.
1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 940 (1958) also involved a quiet title action brought by the
United States with respect to property owned in fee by the Pueblo of Laguna. Two
statutes were at issue in Alonzo, the INIA and Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act of
34

Id. at 39.
Id.
36
Id. at 40.
37
Id.
38
United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
39
Id. at 437.
40
Id. at 442 (citations omitted).
35
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1924, which explicitly imposed a requirement of federal approval with respect to any
conveyance of pueblo lands in New Mexico.41
In Alonzo, different parcels of the property involved had different histories: (a)
51,578.19 acres had been held by the Pueblo in fee since the time of Mexican
sovereignty, (b) 4,693.36 acres consisted of land which initially had been confirmed in
the Pueblo by the United States, but which it later lost to the holders of superior title and
then purchased from those holders, and (c) 480 acres consisted of land adjacent to the
land in (a) and which the Pueblo purchased in fee in the 20th century.42 The court held
that all of the lands at issue were subject to federal restrictions on transfer, and did not
distinguish between the lands held by the Pueblo prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, the lands within those lands lost and then acquired by the Pueblo, and the
small tract adjacent to the Pueblo’s aboriginal lands purchased by the Pueblo. 43
However, given Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act there would likely be no difference
in outcome.
What is central, in reviewing Sandoval, Candelaria, and Alonzo is that they
involve tribal fee titles held by pueblos under grants originating from the Spanish Crown
and restricted under Spanish law. While these cases are frequently cited for the
proposition that the INIA applies to land held by tribes in fee, 44 the nature of the fee titles
in these cases is particular to the pueblos. Restricted fee title held by a pueblo is
treated similarly to aboriginal title as that title is understood in those parts of the country
that had not been under Spanish rule. The cases did not address land that was in the
public domain, patented to non-Indians, and later purchased by a tribe.45
B. The Tuscarora Cases
Before proceeding further, we must note that a number of decisions (for example,
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County46 and Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
41

Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 1957). Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act read:
No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to which
their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall hereafter be
acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico, or in any other
manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale, grant, lease of
any character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claim thereto, made by any
pueblo as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a community of Pueblo Indians, in
the State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity in law or in equity unless the same be
first approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
For a discussion of the essential provisions of the Pueblo Lands Act, see Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985).
42
Alonzo, 249 F.2d at 438–439.
43
Id. at 443–444.
44
See the discussion at IV.C, infra.
45
With the possible exception of the 480 acres in Alonzo that was not separately addressed by the court.
46
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228
(1994).
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Richards,47 both discussed below) refer to the Tuscarora cases48 as standing for the
proposition that the INIA applies to tribal fee lands. That is simply incorrect. The
Tuscarora cases involved the condemnation, for purposes of a reservoir for a
hydroelectric project on the Niagara River, under the authority of Section 21 of the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 814, of land acquired by purchase by the Tuscarora
Nation and held by the Nation in fee.49 The Nation argued that the INIA prohibited the
condemnation.50 The courts, however, did not address whether the INIA applied to the
property; they held, instead, that even if the INIA did so apply it would not stand in the
way of the condemnation:
[W]e must hold that Congress, by the broad general terms of
§ 21 of the Federal Power Act, has authorized the Federal
Power Commission's licensees to take lands owned by
Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed
for a licensed project, upon the payment of just
compensation; that the lands in question are not subject to
any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras . .
.; and that 25 U. S. C. § 177 does not apply to the United
States itself nor prohibit it, or its licensees under the Federal
Power Act, from taking such lands in the manner provided by
§ 21, upon the payment of just compensation.51
In the Tuscarora cases neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court held
that the INIA applied to the lands held by the Nation in fee.
C. Authority that the INIA Applies to Tribal Fee Lands
There have been a few courts that have held that the INIA applies to land
acquired by a tribe and held in fee, but we have not been able to find a case where that
conclusion has controlled the result. As such, the conclusions are dicta. A prime
example is Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. County of Rio Arriba, 883 P.2d 136 (N.M 1994).
This case addressed the scope of the INIA in the context of the question of whether 28
U.S.C. 1360(b)52 deprived a state court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence of an

47

Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039, 1045 (5th Cir. 1996).
Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 257 F.2d 885 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert.denied, 358 U.S.
841 (1958), vacated as moot sub nom., McMorran v. Tuscarora Nation of Indians, 362 U.S. 608 (1960);
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
49
Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 257 F.2d at 887.
50
Id. at 888.
51
Federal Power Commission, 363 U.S. at 123–124.
52
28 U.S.C. 1360(b) states that: “Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or
taxation of any real or personal property . . . belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation
48
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easement over fee lands acquired by the tribe.53 The tribe argued that, under the INIA,
the fee land became subject to a federal restriction upon alienation when it was
acquired by the tribe and, as a result, the state court was without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the existence of the claimed easement.54 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
agreed with the Tribe, holding that “[u]nder federal case law . . . the [land in question]
became subject to federal restrictions against alienation under the INIA when it was
purchased in fee simple by the Tribe in June 1985, and was subject to these restrictions
at the initiation of this lawsuit.”55 However, with the exception of an earlier edition of
Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook, the authorities cited by the court consisted of the three
Pueblo fee land cases (Candelaria, Sandoval, and Alonzo), a case involving trust lands
(United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1938)), and a case under
25 U.S.C. 81 which specifically reserved the question of the applicability of the INIA
(Narragansett Indian Tribe v. RIBO, Inc., 686 F.Supp. 48 (D.R.I. 1988)).56 None of
these authorities provided support for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. On review, the
New Mexico Supreme Court, referring to the same edition of Cohen’s Handbook, stated:
“We . . . agree that the [land in question] became subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States when it was purchased by the Tribe.” 57
However, the New Mexico Supreme Court went on to conclude that that restriction did
not deprive it of jurisdiction to adjudicate the claimed easement and, as a result, the
conclusion did not control the result in the case.58
In Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039 (5th Cir. 1996), the
court cited the 1885 opinion of Attorney General Garland, 59 Alonzo, the Tuscarora
cases, and situations of aboriginal, treaty, or trust title as authority for its conclusion that
“[t]he Nonintercourse Act protects a tribe’s interest in land whether that interest is based
on aboriginal right, purchase, or transfer from a state.” 60 However, the court found that
the tribe had no interest in the land in question to be protected by the Act. 61 Again, the
conclusion that the INIA applied to the land did not control the result.

imposed by the United States; . . . or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate
proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.”
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Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. County of Rio Arriba, 862 P.2d 428, 432 (N.M.App. 1993).
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Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. County of Rio Arriba, 883 P.2d 136, 140 (N.M 1994).
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D. Authority that the INIA Does Not Apply to Tribal Fee Lands
Although, as we have seen, the INIA has often been read broadly, no case has
applied the Act to tribal fee lands62 so as to invalidate a transfer or encumbrance of
those lands. To the contrary, there are a number of decisions holding that the Act does
not apply to property that had been placed in the public domain, patented to non-Indians
and then purchased by a tribe, whether within or outside the boundaries of the tribe’s
reservation. Unlike the cases discussed in the immediately preceding section, here the
conclusion as to the reach of the INIA did control the results.
The lead case in this section is Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d
1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994). Lummi involved an attempt by
Whatcom County, Washington, to impose ad valorem property taxation on land located
within the Tribe’s reservation that had been allotted, and patented in fee to Lummi tribal
members under the Treaty of Point Elliot of 1855, and later acquired by the Tribe. 63 The
Tribe contended that once the land was acquired by it, the INIA rendered the lands
inalienable and protected from taxation, citing the Tuscarora cases, 7,405.3 Acres of
Land, and the Pueblo fee land cases.64 The court rejected the argument based on the
facts that (1) the federal government had previously removed any restraints on the
alienation of the land in question, and (2) the government created a procedure through
which tribes can convert their fee lands to trust.65 The Court said that:
No court has held that Indian land approved for alienation by
the federal government and then reacquired by a tribe again
becomes inalienable. To the contrary, courts have said that
once Congress removes restraints on alienation of land, the
protections of the Nonintercourse Act no longer apply.
Moreover, the statutory authorization for the sale of Indian
land following proper government approval makes no
mention of reimposing restrictions should a tribe reacquire
the land. Rather, the broad statutory language suggests
that, once sold, the land becomes forever alienable. We
62

Excluding Pueblo fee lands for the reasons given above. See supra Part IV.A.
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1993). The ability of a state or
local government to tax tribal fee lands involves many issues in addition to the issue of the application of
the INIA that are far beyond the scope of this paper. We address here only those decisions in which the
courts have addressed the applicability of the INIA as a defense against taxation. We also note that
taxation and condemnation cases raise the issue of whether the INIA applies to involuntary transfers,
given the Act’s reference to “purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance.” Some courts have concluded
that the Act “applies only to voluntary conveyances by the tribes themselves and not to involuntary
conveyances by the state for nonpayment of taxes.” See, e.g., Bay Mills Indian Community v. State, 626
N.W.2d 169, 173 (Mich.App. 2001).
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hold that the parcels of land approved for alienation by the
federal government and then reacquired by the Tribe did not
then become inalienable by operation of the Nonintercourse
Act.66
A similar result, also in the context of taxation, was reached in Saginaw
Chippewa Tribe v. State of Michigan, 882 F.Supp. 659 (E.D. Mich. 1995), rev’d on other
grounds 106 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub. nom.
Michigan v. United States, 524 U.S. 923 (1998).67 The court reached the same
conclusion as the Ninth Circuit and held that the INIA did not apply to land that had
been patented and later acquired by a tribe:
[I]f all land held by Indian tribes were automatically restricted
by operation of the Nonintercourse Act, then the Tribe would
not have to submit to the cumbersome and lengthy process
the United States referred to in oral argument and in its
briefs whereby Tribes may petition the Department of the
Interior to place lands owned by them into trust. If return to
trust status were automatic via the Nonintercourse Act, a
petitioning process to return land to trust status would be
superfluous.68
The same conclusion was reached, not in the taxation context, in Anderson &
Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1996). That
case involved an action to quiet title to 80 acres of land within the Quinault reservation
that had been patented in 1958 and in which the Quinault Nation subsequently acquired
a one-sixth undivided interest in fee.69 The court relied upon Lummi and Saginaw
Chippewa in reaching its conclusion that the INIA does not apply to land as to which the
United States had removed restraints on alienation by patent and which was then
reacquired by a tribe.70

66

Id. at 1359 (citations omitted).
This case demonstrates the point made in footnote 63. The Section 177 argument was only addressed
in the District Court; the Sixth Circuit’s reversal (in turn, vacated by the Supreme Court) was based on a
question of Congressional intent as to the taxability of the lands in question.
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Id. at 676. For practitioners of federal Indian law, loose language such as this is highly frustrating.
Applying the INIA to tribal fee lands would not result in those lands becoming trust lands. Title to trust
lands is in the United States with the tribes having the beneficial interest; restricting the alienation of tribal
fee lands wouldn’t result in a transfer of the fee from the tribe to the federal government. It is true,
however, that the practical consequences of the application of the INIA to fee lands would be similar to a
conversion to trust status.
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These three decisions—Lummi, Saginaw Chippewa, and Anderson &
Middleton—have been followed by other decisions in which courts have had little
difficulty dismissing claims of the application of the INIA to tribal fee lands when those
lands had been patented, owned by non-Indian parties, and then acquired by a tribe.71
E. Congressional and Administrative Interpretations
While some cases have generated confusion because of their failure to analyze
the application of the INIA in its proper historical context, that confusion has been
compounded by actions in the Congressional and Administrative areas. A number of
tribes seeking to sell or encumber their tribal fee lands, including the Navajo Nation, 72
the Rumsey Indian Rancheria,73 the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,74 the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,75 the Lower Sioux Indian Community,76 the
Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana,77 and the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community78
have sought and obtained Congressional authorization to do so through legislation. The
legislative history of these acts generally makes little reference to the court decisions
but simply refers to the plain wording of the INIA. A typical example is found in the
legislative history of the Lower Sioux act as it was being considered in the House of
Representatives, where Mr. Sherwood (R-PA), in speaking in favor, said that:
[e]xisting Federal law enacted in 1834 provides that an
Indian tribe may not lease, sell, or otherwise convey land
which it has acquired unless conveyance is approved by
Congress. This antiquated law applies even though the land
was purchased by the tribe with its own money, and even
though the land is located outside the tribe’s reservation, and
even though the land has never been taken into trust for the
tribe.79
Sometimes this conclusion makes it into the legislation itself. For example,
among the findings in the legislation authorizing the Rumsey Indian Rancheria to sell a
tribally-owned fee parcel located 125 miles away from the tribe’s trust lands is the
71
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following statement: “Section 2116 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. 177) prohibits the
conveyance of any lands owned by Indian tribes without the consent of Congress.” 80
Administratively, the regulations of the Department of the Interior addressing the
sale, exchange, or conveyance of tribal lands provide:
Lands held in trust by the United States for an Indian tribe,
lands owned by a tribe with Federal restrictions against
alienation and any other land owned by an Indian tribe may
only be conveyed where specific statutory authority exists
and then only with the approval of the Secretary unless the
Act of Congress authorizing sale provides that approval is
unnecessary.81
Thus, the recent Congressional and Administrative authority, to the
extent that it exists, supports the proposition that the INIA applies to tribal
fee lands but does so without analysis and without addressing the
numerous court decisions holding otherwise.
V. Proposed Legislative Solution
We have found two lines of authority, which do not refer to each other. The 19 th
century Attorney General opinions, the legislative history, occasional Congressional
findings, and the Department of the Interior regulations lead to the conclusion that the
INIA applies to tribal fee lands just as it does to any other tribal lands, but none of those
authorities refer to the judicial decisions. Conversely, recent cases in both federal and
state courts hold that, once land has been patented and placed in the public domain,
the acquisition of that land by a tribe does not render it subject to the Act, but none of
those cases refer to the Congressional findings or the legislative history of the various
acts authorizing the sale or encumbrance of tribal fee lands, nor do they discuss the
Attorney General opinions or the Interior Department regulations. There are also recent
cases that support a broader application of the Act, but those cases did not lead to an
invalidation of any transfer (and even those cases did not discuss the Congressional or
Administrative authorities). The result is confusion.
If we go back to the reason for the enactment of the INIA in the first instance—to
confirm the doctrine of preemption in United States law following the Revolution and to
protect tribal landholdings from the grasping hands of ambitious states and settlers—
there appears to be little justification in applying the Act to land patented, placed in the
public domain, and then acquired in fee by a tribe. As to that land—land not part of a
80
81

Pub. L. 101–630, § 101.
25 C.F.R. 152.22(b).
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tribe’s aboriginal or trust holdings—a tribe should be able to buy, sell, mortgage, and
otherwise deal with it as would any other landowner. The present, conflicting authorities
impair the tribes’ ability to deal with their fee land as other landowners, regardless of
whether the land in question is within or outside the tribe’s reservation boundaries.
In order to resolve the uncertainties over a tribe’s ability to sell or encumber its
fee lands, the authors propose the consideration by Congress of a statute of general
application similar to those that have been enacted on a case-by-case basis for
individual tribes. In doing so, we are mindful of the different considerations that must be
given to lands acquired in fee by a tribe within its reservation boundaries (often as part
of a program of land restoration) and lands acquired elsewhere.82 While the
considerations of a tribe’s ability to use financing in order to acquire land initially, and its
ability to derive economic value from such land after acquisition, apply to lands located
within a reservation as well as lands located elsewhere, the risk of a possible repeat
loss of reacquired reservation lands might lead tribal leaders to prefer not to have any
confirmation of conveyance authority apply to on-reservation fee lands.83
We propose the following language, with square brackets indicating options to be
considered in the context of the on-reservation/off-reservation issue noted above:
APPROVAL OF TRANSACTIONS BY INDIAN TRIBES
WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN LANDS
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, without further approval, ratification, or authorization by
the United States, any Indian tribe may lease, sell, convey,
warrant, or otherwise transfer all or any part of such tribe’s
interest in any real property that is-(1) [not located within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation of such tribe;
(2)] not held in trust by the United States for the
benefit of the tribe; and
82

For example, in discussing the application of the INIA to tribal fee lands, the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior has said that it “appears to [be] … the litigating position of the United States” that there is a
distinction as to applicability between fee lands located within and those located without a reservation,
“unless some extenuating circumstances exist.” Opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
M-37023 (Jan. 18, 2009). The uncertain nature of the conclusion in the opinion—which did not cite the
Department’s own regulation on the subject—is indicative of the extent of the problem.
83
We note that not applying the proposed statute to on-reservation fee lands would not change the result
of the taxation cases discussed above, and that, as a result, reacquired fee lands even with a reservation
would likely continue to be exposed to taxation, condemnation or conveyance to the extent that such
cases are followed.
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[(2)][(3)] not real property owned in fee by an Indian
Pueblo on July 4, 1848[, continuously owned by such Indian
Pueblo since that date,] and located within the area formerly
part of the Republic of Mexico and made part of the United
States of America under the Treaty of Peace, Friendship,
Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico.
(b) [Trust][Certain] Land Not Affected.--Nothing in this
section is intended or shall be construed to-(1) authorize any Indian tribe to lease, sell, convey,
warrant, or otherwise transfer all or any part of an interest in
any real property that is [located within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation of the tribe or] held in trust by
the United States for the benefit of the tribe; or
(2) affect the operation of any law governing leasing,
selling, conveying, warranting, or otherwise transferring any
interest in such [trust] land.
VI. Conclusion
In the hotel acquisition transaction described at the beginning of this article,
neither the tribe’s nor the bank’s attorneys could conclude with confidence that the tribe
could grant a mortgage on the fee land that it planned to acquire. The parties were able
to solve the problem with the cooperation of the seller of the hotel by placing the
encumbrance on the land prior to its acquisition by the tribe. In a series of preplanned
steps, the seller granted a mortgage on the parcel to the bank in order to secure the
tribe’s obligations to the bank under the loan documents; the tribe then used the
proceeds of the loan to acquire the land and hotel from the seller subject to the existing
mortgage; the tribe then assumed the obligations of the mortgagor under the mortgage
instrument; and the bank then released the seller from liability under the mortgage. At
the end of the series of transactions the tribe owned the land and hotel in fee, subject to
a mortgage that was in place at the time of acquisition. Through this process, there was
no “purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance” of any interest in the site by the tribe;
the encumbrance was already existing when the tribe took title.
This procedure worked in that particular transaction because the tribe did not
start out with any interest in the land and the three parties—tribe, bank, and seller—
were willing to work together to solve the problem. In particular, the cooperation of the
seller (who had to start the chain of events by placing a mortgage on his land prior to
being paid for it) was essential. Not all real estate transactions involving tribal fee lands
will take place in such favorable environs. In order to address the problem, and to
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enable tribes to enter into desirable commercial real estate transactions without
hindrance from an unclear law, the authors recommend consideration of the proposed
legislative solution described above.
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